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Franco-German Friendship: An Indispensible Factor in European
Stability
The German School in Washington, coming together with the French Lycee Rochambeau, is an excellent place for celebrating the anniversary of the Franco-German treaty signed at the Elysée Palace on January 22, 1963. It gives me a great opportunity to remember the meaning of the Franco-German relationship in my own life, and to reflect on its current status and where it is leading us now.
My father gave me my first lesson in geopolitics, in the mid-fifties when I was around 12 years old. It was about 10 years after the end of the Second World War, the third conflict in which the Germans and the French fought so terribly against each other. Like most French men at that time, my father had endured the horror of that war. His statement was: “Thou shall learn German.” German was more difficult than English for us, French-speakers, and was a language implicitly reserved for the best students. But my father’s arguments for having me learn German were not that he wanted me in the best classes. His argument was that “If you can speak with your neighbor you will not fight with him.”
For the young people, and the less young today, it is difficult to imagine the intensity and the importance of the relationship between Germany and France since the War.
I still remember, in my grandmother’s village, in Burgundy, the time when we needed food stamps to buy basic products, not because we had no money, but because the war had ruined both the French and German economies. Merchandise was rare and often unavailable. The center of the village was a square in which most houses had been destroyed by the war. It was like a ghost town that frightened the children. It was not until the sixties that it was cleaned up and turned into a beautiful flower garden. I remember the frequent ceremonies at the “monument aux morts,” the memorial for the village sons who were killed in the war. And I also remember the endless conversations that took place during lunch on Sundays, after Mass, when my grandmother would recount what happened when her big house was occupied by German troops. And the story always ended the same way. My father would joke that, although the Germans occupied France, at the end of the day, it was she –my grand mother- who ruled over the German soldiers in the house. And she would end with the story that took place toward the end of the war, when younger and younger German soldiers were moved out to the Russian front, where they all knew that they would get killed. My grandmother would tell us about a young German soldier, perhaps 16, who slowly climbed the outside stairs to her kitchen in uniform to say good bye, and fell in tears in her arms. Yes, she was French, and he was German. But she was the only motherly comfort he could find. My grandmother would explain to us how difficult it was to be nice to him for a moment only, because being nice with a German soldier could be considered treason. And Sunday after Sunday, we would talk about the absurdity of fighting and how hard it must have been for the Germans as well as for the French to fight those absurd wars.
And suddenly, something changed in the village. Germans were attending memorial ceremonies alongside the French. The 1963 treaty had been signed between France and Germany. Thanks to General Charles De Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, instead of calling for revenge, a new order of the day was declared: “Le Jumelage.” German and French cities were asked to choose a partner on the other side of the border. This was the age of twin cities. A village in Bavaria became the twin of my grandmother’s village. For the most important ceremonies, people from this Bavarian village would come in buses to enjoy the wine of Burgundy and the villagers from Burgundy would go to Bavaria to taste their beer and wine. As peace returned, so did prosperity and joy. When the French and Germans began to work together instead of against each other, other Europeans joined in, and this led to the European Union and the unity of our continent as we know it.
I am telling this simple story because I know how difficult it is today to understand that the relationship between France and Germany is like a miracle. It cannot be compared with anything else, because it is based on a consideration of many deaths and much suffering that occurred between 1870 and 1945. The Minister Counselor of the German Embassy in Washington, Dr. Erberhard Koelsch, put it this way: “This relationship is often compared with a marriage, but it is more than a marriage, because in this case it is impossible to divorce.” It is impossible to divorce, because of the magnitude of the risk and the memories it would evoke. Even if this relationship, like any relationship, has its ups and downs, it remains the indispensable basis for the stability and prosperity of Europe, which is itself indispensable to the world.
STILL AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR IN EUROPEAN STABILITY
We live in a different world today. The European Union is a large entity. In this new context, it is important to remember that the Franco-German relationship is not only at the heart of the European Union. It is the very heart of the European Union. If the Franco-German relationship is strong, and Germany and France are strong also, then the European Union is rock solid. If they are not, the European Union is not.
Some people think that this is less true now, because of the enlargement of the European Union. Originally, the Common Market that France and Germany initiated with the Benelux countries and Italy was small enough that the Franco-German influence was preponderant. Then the 6 countries extended to 12, then to 15, and recently they decided on 25 before 2004, a number that may increase in 2007. When the European Union consists of 25 countries and more, one wonders whether Germany and France are still as important, and whether the Franco-German friendship is still as essential a factor in European stability and prosperity.
It is obvious to some of us that this is the case. First, if the French and the Germans began quarrelling again, the Union would crack. Second, when France and Germany stick together, they also keep the other members together. Third, when their relative power is decreasing, Germany and France have a vested interest in working together to maintain their influence to achieve their common goals, particularly looking for economic growth, and preventing negative forces or centripetal movements from disturbing the European integration which is in the process of happening.
From this standpoint, the Franco-German friendship not only remains at the heart of the European Union. It is the key to its future.
IN PERMANENT EVOLUTION
But being friends does not necessarily mean that it is easy to agree on everything. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Franco-German relationship has experienced a variety of difficulties for a number of reasons. Both countries were trying to face their own challenges. For Germany, it was primarily the fact of absorbing 16 million people from the East. For the French, the economic slowdown, the rise of unemployment, and the prospects for the introduction of the Euro were creating obligations of a different nature. While Germany was generously spending its capital to accommodate the East, France conducted very strict economic and monetary policies in preparation for the replacement of the Franc by the Euro. To add to the difficulties of the moment, the French public opinion was conscious that through the European Union it would indirectly be paying for part of the German reunification that would ultimately benefit mostly Germany. Implementing the single market and the introduction of the Euro among a larger group of countries became a national goal for both countries, but with different perspectives. There was also an implicit wish to keep the new larger Germany within the framework of European institutions so that a larger and potentially more powerful Germany could not become dangerously nationalistic again.
These tensions were particularly obvious on the occasion of the Nice Summit, under the French Presidency, in 2000, when Chancellor Schroeder insisted that the representation of Germany in the European Parliament be increased to reflect the addition of several million East Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany. This request was finally accepted, but it shattered a previously important myth in the Franco-German relationship - that of equality, which was supposed to allow for a balanced relationship. The previous balance resulted from the fact that while Germany was larger, France was politically more powerful, particularly with nuclear weapons that the German Constitution forbade to the Federal Republic. Since Nice, it is clear that Germany is larger and it has the largest representation in the European Parliament.
In the long run, there are two types of negative forces that are threatening the special relationship between the two countries are: for France the temptation to withdraw into its corner if it does not find the place in the enlarged Europe that it believes it deserves; and for Germany, the risk of intoxicating itself with the idea of a vastly increased national power for the “Berlin Republic.”
However, Germany did not evolve the way the French anticipated. Paris seems to be even surprised that what is now called the “Berlin Republic” does not aspire to more than it does. There are many reasons for this. Germany is still in the process of absorbing its reunification. Economic reforms have been too slow to allow for enough economic growth in recent years. And demographic trends are such that Germany and France are likely to progressively come close to the same level of population again.
In 2002, the June elections in France and the September elections in Germany have brought back two heads of States from opposite parties. This could have worsened the situation. The French President, Jacques Chirac is conservative, while his German counterpart, Gerhard Schroeder, is socialist. But the way they work together reminds everyone that their differences are not more important than were those of François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl in the 80’s. They are just the other way around. At that time the socialist was in France and the conservative in Germany. As in the past, what matters most are not party affiliations, but the agreement between the two not to disagree.
The leaders of both countries try to go back to the same kind of posture that De Gaulle and Adenauer initiated. They have overriding common interests on both sides, including the need to reinforce each other both on the international political scene and on the economic front.
QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA
Nevertheless there are several delicate questions on their political radars. Among them are the issues related to their respective budgetary contributions to the European Union and the kind of proposals they would like the European convention to make regarding the institutional reforms of the European Union.
France is on paper the second net contributor in the European Union after Germany. But because it receives returns from agricultural supports, its net disbursements are lower. Although it has a GNP per head roughly equal to the French, Germany makes a net payment of about 112 euros per capita into the budget; whereas the French net contribution represents only some 20 euros per capita. This remains from the period when the German economy was much stronger than the French and Germany could afford to spend more than France to build the European Union. There will have to be some kind of agreement between France and Germany to reduce this imbalance and to free money for new tasks such as border protection, a common foreign and security policy, improved infrastructure and high-tech programs.
In a recent agreement between France and Germany, any changes in the Common Agricultural Policy –which would reduce agricultural supports to France thereby increasing its net contribution to the EU- has been linked to the abandonment of the British budgetary rebate. This rebate is a provision obtained by Prime Minister Thatcher. It reduces the British contribution in consideration of the fact that other countries benefit from agricultural supports while the UK does not. The moment other countries discontinue this support the British special treatment will be reconsidered. The CAP system will be maintained in principle until 2013. But creative solutions will be necessary to work out the next European budgetary framework.
Another important question that is crucial to the Franco-German relationship has to do with the proposals for the institutional reform of the European Union. Until recently, France and Germany seemed to have different approaches and different proposals. The German approach is more federalist. The French approach is based on retaining the importance of the nation-States. After the 2002 elections, the German and the French governments have decided to delegate both their foreign ministers, Joschka Fischer and Dominique de Villepin, to represent them at the European Convention. Since the ministers regularly meet to coordinate their policies, the goal was obviously to generate joint proposals. This happened on January 15, 2002. The solutions proposed by Germany and France offer the basis for the final agreement to be worked out by all the European countries.
Another potentially divisive question is the military intervention in Iraq. Both governments have called for a second UN resolution to allow for such an intervention. They followed a close consultative process.
Another important question that is not yet resolved is the future of German and French defense policies. What are the ambitions of each country? What kind of a European defense pillar would they like? At what cost? Those questions are likely to be addressed soon.
For better and for worst, Germany and France now maintain a dense network of personal and professional relationships, as well as a powerful system of consultation and coordination on a great variety of subjects, ranging from budgetary policies to foreign and security issues. The heads of State meet often, as do their ministers.
POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
One critic that is sometimes voiced about the evolution of the Franco-German relationship is that it remains too institutional. After the post-war enthusiasm on exchange projects, there is less excitement about learning each other’s languages and cultures. As English becomes the language of communication, it is important to avoid limiting the use of each other’s language to experts only. For young professionals who are bi-lingual in French and German, in addition to speaking English, there are more and better career opportunities, in part because the number of people who can operate in both languages easily is still too low.
One goal that remains to fully implement the Franco-German treaty from 1963 is the provision for exchange programs and language training. The education ministers from the two governments have publicly admitted that this goal is more important than ever. It is not any more in a post war context, but in view of the necessity to be able to easily communicate with each other in the European Union.
There is also a need for Franco-German leadership to encourage the economy to grow faster, increase the level of employment.
Finally, one should recognize the need to find the right balance between what used to be called Ost-Politik (German policies towards the East), European policies, transatlantic relations, and Franco-German bilateral relations. The Franco-German friendship is, for both France and Germany, a difficult balancing exercise, not only between them, but also with others. The French and the Germans know that their partners, in the European Union and outside of it, are always worried about the French-German relationship. When it functions well they worry because they are afraid of its influence. When it does not function well, they are even more worried because they know that it does not augur well for the European Union.
But as today’s threats and challenges come from beyond the European and American continent, a strong transatlantic cooperation is necessary to face them. The European pillar of this transatlantic relationship must be strong. And the Franco-German cooperation is a contribution to it.
For most of the young people at this time, the French-German friendship is natural. It is part of life. But when you look around and see the state of relations among others, you realize that it is extraordinary. It is the product of an ambitious and controversial vision that was brought to reality at the beginning of the 60’s by the German Chancellor Adenauer and the French General De Gaulle, a vision recognized as an overwhelming goal by their successors until today. It is a good example that countries in conflict with each other right now might want to contemplate, and perhaps follow.
Jacqueline Grapin |
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